000			01254nam a22001577a 4500
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008			231107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_a Häfner, Samuel and Taylor,Curtis R. _945745
245			_aWorking for references
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(3), Aug, 2023: p.33-77
520			_aWe analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever production is successful, and workers holding references are hired with certainty in the ensuing period. Compared to a setting without references: the bonus-contract offers are lower, yet the workers' equilibrium effort is higher. Profits and welfare are higher, yet aggregate worker welfare is lower. Also, firms do not fully internalize the incentive effect of references and could typically increase profits and welfare by jointly raising bonuses.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210299
650			_aJob references _945746
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aEMPLOYMENT
942			_cAR