000			01139nam a22001337a 4500
999			_c524252 _d524252
008			231107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJungbauer, Thomas and Waldman,Michael _941527
245			_aSelf-reported signaling
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(3), Aug, 2023: p.78-117
520			_aIn many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender's service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling models that there is overinvestment in the action and that the possibility of misrepresentation may in fact improve welfare given self-reported signaling.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210204
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
942			_cAR