000			01242nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524253 _d524253
008			231107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHuangfu, Bingchao and Liu, Heng _945744
245			_aInformation spillover in multi-good adverse selection
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(3), Aug, 2023: p.118-165
520			_aThis paper analyzes information spillover in a multi-good adverse selection model in which a privately informed seller trades two different goods in two different markets. Buyers learn the seller's information from both the market they participate in and the trading outcomes in the other market. We identify a sufficient negative correlation condition under which information spillover reduces efficiency loss. We also discover a novel type of coordination friction that leads to multiple equilibria, which can be welfare-ranked by the number of initial no-trade periods. When the sufficient negative correlation condition fails, the efficiency loss is the same as in the case without information spillover.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20190287
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aTRADES
942			_cAR