000			01242nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524255 _d524255
008			231107b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCao, Dan and Lagunoff, Roger _945748
245			_aThe dynamics of property rights in modern autocracies
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(3), Aug, 2023: p.305-353
520			_aWe study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privatization in many autocracies. Calibrating to Russian and Chinese data, simulations to mid-twenty-first century display widening wealth gaps between elites and the populace. Anocracies mitigate this outcome.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210229
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aPROPERTY RIGHTS
942			_cAR