000			01556nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524667 _d524667
008			240110b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBelardinelli, Paolo _947912
245			_aPerformance-related pay, fairness perceptions, and effort in public management tasks: A parallel encouragement design
260			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
300			_a89(4), Dec, 2023: p.1062-1078
520			_aThis randomized study explores the causal mechanisms linking contingent pay to individual performance on a series of tasks mimicking real public management activities. Employing a parallel encouragement design in a laboratory setting, we disentangle the overall, direct, and indirect performance effects of perceived fairness as well as a pay scheme that reproduces the merit system provisions adopted by the Italian government. The overall performance effect of that contingent pay scheme turned out to be insignificant when averaged across the four experimental tasks. However, a significant pay-for-performance effect was detected for the most routine task. Moreover, we observed heterogeneity in the treatment effect depending on the participants’ relative positioning in the performance ranking. Overall, the data do not provide support for a mediation model linking contingent pay-for-performance through perceived fairness. – Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00208523221105374
773			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
906			_aPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
942			_cAR