000			01247nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524754 _d524754
008			240116b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGranzier, Riako, Pons, Vincent, and Tricaud,Clemence _948082
245			_aCoordination and bandwagon effects: How past rankings shape the behavior of voters and candidates
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a15(4), Oct, 2023: p.177-217
520			_aCandidates' placements in polls and past elections can be powerful coordination devices for parties and voters. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round elections, we show that candidates who place first in the first round are more likely to stay in the race and win than those who placed second. These effects are even larger for ranking second versus third, and also present for third versus fourth. They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the bandwagon effect of wanting to vote for the winner. We find similar results across 19 other countries.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210840
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aELECTIONS
942			_cAR