000			01222nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524755 _d524755
008			240116b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLafortune, Jeanne and Low, Corinne _948081
245			_aCollateralized marriage
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a15(4), Oct, 2023: p.252-291
520			_aMarriage rates have become increasingly stratified by homeownership. We investigate this in a household model where investments in public goods reduce future earnings and, thus, divorce risk creates inefficiencies. Access to a joint savings technology, like a house, collateralizes marriage, providing insurance to the lower-earning partner and increasing specialization, public goods, and value from marriage. We use idiosyncratic variation in housing prices to show that homeownership access indeed leads to greater specialization. The model also predicts that policies that erode the marriage contract in other ways will make wealth a more important determinant of marriage, which we confirm empirically.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210614
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aMARRIAGE
942			_cAR