000			01531nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c524789 _d524789
008			240117b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSu, Su and Ni, Xing _948126
245			_aCorruption in social relations: Bribe-taking, corruptibility, and corruption risks
260			_aPublic Administration: An international Quarterly
300			_a101(2), Jun, 2023: p. 481-499
520			_aThis inquiry aims to investigate how the relational dynamics are imprinted on two critical dimensions of bribe-taking: corruptibility and corruption risks. Two treatments were randomly administered to 1400 subjects: single versus repeated interactions and strangers versus weak ties. The findings suggest that repeated interactions induce bigger bribe sizes, but also increase risks from whistleblowing and internal auditing. Weak ties mitigate bribe-taking willingness. Nevertheless, when coupled with repeated interactions, weak ties suppress the risks from whistleblowing, testifying the bifurcated effects. The tensions between corruptibility and corruption risks suggest that bribe-taking decisions are fraught with internal tensions, with the overall effects likely being a priori determined only in specific contexts. Such tensions are more intensified among true bureaucrats as they tend to claim bigger bribes and report more risks from internal auditing.- Reproduced https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/padm.12795
773			_aPublic Administration: An international Quarterly
906			_aCORRUPTION
942			_cAR