000			01455nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c525202 _d525202
008			240214b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMarinovic, Iván and Szydlowski, Martin _949956
245			_aMonitor reputation and transparency
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(4), Nov, 2023: p.1-67
520			_aWe study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220006
650			_aRegulator Monitor Reputation concerns Manager Manipulation Reputational incentives Intermediate reputation Transparency Disclosure policy Diminished incentives Random delay Noisy information Verifiable disclosure Aggressive disclosure Enforcement tools _949957
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aREGULATOR
942			_cAR