000			00995nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c525203 _d525203
008			240214b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aQuint, Daniel and Weretka, Marek _949955
245			_aSlope takers in anonymous markets
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a15(4), Nov, 2023: p.306-318
520			_aWe present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220078
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aECONOMICS
942			_cAR