000			01710nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c525290 _d525290
008			240221b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFlatt, Henry and Do, Nhat-Dang _950018
245			_aAnalytic bureaucracy and the policy process: Evidence from California
260			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
300			_a53(5-6), Jul-Aug, 2023: p.243-257
520			_aWe argue that “analytic” bureaucratic agencies are essential actors in the policy process because of their role acting as both information processing organizations and policy design specialists. Analytic agencies can exert unique influence over lawmaking activities because legislators consider them expert informational sources in a multitude of areas. Rather than assume policy advice falls rigidly into either “political” or “technical” forms of information, we show that an analytic office can produce both types of content. Whereas previous policy process scholarship almost exclusively examines elected officials and federal agencies, this article tests our theory using a state agency, California's Department of Finance (DOF). Our findings demonstrate how the Governor delegates partisan legislative signaling duties and neutral expert budgetary advice to the same trusted analytic personnel. The data include every introduced bill in six recently completed legislative sessions and show how DOF recommendations are strongly associated with bill passage and the Governor's veto. – Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02750740231164414
650			_aBureaucratic agencies _950019
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
906			_aBUREAUCRACY
942			_cAR