000			01183nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c525329 _d525329
008			240222b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAllen, R.C., Bertazzini, M.C. and Heldring, L. _950061
245			_aThe economic origins of government
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a113(10), Oct, 2023: p.2507-2545
520			_aWe test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision. – Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20201919
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aECONOMICS
942			_cAR