000			01201nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c525330 _d525330
008			240222b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGershkov, Alex et al _950063
245			_aOptimal insurance: Dual utility, random losses, and adverse selection
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a113(10), Oct, 2023: p.2581-2614
520			_aWe study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance contracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with coverage limits–premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility functional (Yaari 1987).- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20221247
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aINSURANCE
942			_cAR