000			01158nam a22001337a 4500
999			_c525530 _d525530
008			240320b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aPires, H.C., Chade, H. and Swinkels, J. _950315
245			_aDisentangling moral hazard and adverse selection
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a114(1), Jan, 2024: p.1.37
520			_aWhile many real-world principal-agent problems have both moral hazard and adverse selection, existing tools largely analyze only one at a time. Do the insights from the separate analyses survive when the frictions are combined? We develop a simple method—decoupling—to study both problems at once. When decoupling works, everything we know from the separate analyses carries over, but interesting interactions also arise. We provide simple tests for whether decoupling is valid. We develop and numerically implement an algorithm to calculate the decoupled solution and check its validity. We also provide primitives for decoupling to work and analyze several extensions.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20220100
773			_aThe American Economic Review
942			_cAR