000			02115nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c525585 _d525585
008			240322b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMark Des, Jardine, R. Shi, Wei and Cheng, Xin _950795
245			_aThe new invisible hand: How common owners use the media as a strategic tool
260			_aAdministrative Science Quarterly
300			_a68(4), Dec, 2023: p.956-1007
520			_aWhile research has uncovered an array of visible competitive dynamics, a strategic world of competition lies beneath the surface that should also be theorized and empirically traced. We investigate the strategic consequences of “media–rival” common ownership, in which investors own a media company and a non-media focal firm’s rivals. We posit that focal firms receive worse coverage from media outlets when institutional investors hold substantial ownership in both a media company and the focal firm’s rivals because the investors’ common holdings provide them with incentives and power to enhance the competitiveness of their portfolio firms by tainting the focal firm’s media coverage. We account for three moderators to show that this effect amplifies when investors have stronger incentives and power to influence the media and when media executives have incentives to cater to the interests of their investors. Using a novel dataset on common ownership of rival firms and media companies, we find support for our theory. Our study reveals a new invisible hand underlying competitive markets and offers a new view of the media as a strategic tool. – Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00018392231192863
650			_aMedia–Rival Common Ownership, Competitive Dynamics Strategic Competition Common Ownership Media Company Non-Media Focal Firm Institutional Investors Media Coverage Competitiveness Portfolio Firms Strategic Consequences Incentives Power to Influence Media Executives Novel Dataset Rival Firms Competitive Markets Media as a Strategic Tool _950796
773			_aAdministrative Science Quarterly
906			_aMASS MEDIA
942			_cAR