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100			_aIossa, Elisabetta _951896
245			_aCoordination in the fight against collusion
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(1), Feb, 2024: p.224-261
520			_aWhile antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that "large" buyers are less susceptible to collusion.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220194#:~:text=By%20contrast%2C%20there%20is%20never,collusive%20conduct%20by%20their%20suppliers.
650			_aAntitrust Authorities, Collusive Conduct, Delegation of Deterrence, Procurement Context, Buyer Strategies, Multimarket Buyer, Centralized Procurement Authority, Large Buyers, Susceptibility to Collusion. _951897
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aMICRO-ECONOMICS
942			_cAR