000			01388nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c525989 _d525989
008			240430b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSchipani, Andrés _951934
245			_aLeft behind: Labor unions and redistributive policy under the Brazilian workers' party
260			_aComparative Politics
300			_a54(3), Apr, 2022: p.405-428
520			_aHow do leftist governments negotiate the trade-off between courting union support and maintaining the business sector's trust? Scholars have argued that leftist parties will remain accountable to their labor base when powerful unions have strong ties to centralized leftist parties. However, I argue that strong party-union ties and party leadership centralization may, in fact, insulate leftist presidents against redistributive pressures from below. When party-union ties allow labor leaders to develop careers as professional politicians, these leaders become more responsive to the party's goals than to their union base. Further, a centralized party organization can exclude unions and leftist factions from the design of redistributive policies. To test my argument, I use a case study of Brazil under the administration of the Worker's Party (PT).- Reproduced https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2022/00000054/00000003/art00002
773			_aComparative Politics
906			_aLABOURS
942			_cAR