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_aZarkin, Jessica _951938 |
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| 245 | _aThe silent militarization: Explaining the logic of military members' appointment as police chiefs | ||
| 260 | _aComparative Politics | ||
| 300 | _a 55(4), Jul, 2023: p.549-572 | ||
| 520 | _aWhat explains the militarization of public safety? Despite its failures, police militarization remains a popular policy. Existing scholarship has mainly focused on the police adopting military weapons and tactics but has neglected a silent but consequential type: the appointment of military members as police chiefs. Whereas the conventional wisdom points to partisanship and violence as key drivers, I argue that the militarization of police leaders responds to political motives. Based on a novel data set on 5,580 appointments in Mexico and repeated event history analysis, I find evidence of a top-down militarization sequence. Mayors are more likely to appoint military chiefs when upper levels of government and peers embrace a militarized security strategy. I further illustrate how coercive pressures and strategic incentives drive this sequence- Reproduced https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2023/00000055/00000004/art00003 | ||
| 773 | _aComparative Politics | ||
| 906 | _aPOLICING | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||