000			01218nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c526021 _d526021
008			240503b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAvery, C., Chen, F. and McAdms, D. _952168
245			_aSteady-state social distancing and vaccination
260			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
300			_a6(1), Mar, 2024: p.1-19
520			_aThis paper analyzes an economic-epidemiological model of infectious disease where it is possible to become infected more than once and individual agents make endogenous choices of social distancing and vaccine adoption. Protective actions adopted by any one person reduce future risks to other people. The positive externalities associated with these behaviors provide motivation for vaccine and social-distancing subsidies, but subsidizing one protective action reduces incentives for other protective actions. A vaccine subsidy increases vaccine adoption and reduces steady-state infection prevalence; a social distancing subsidy can either increase or reduce steady-state infection prevalence.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20220699
773			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
906			_aPANDEMIC
942			_cAR