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999			_c526794 _d526794
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100			_aFriesenhahn, Amy _955187
245			_aAt the intersection of gender and party: Legislative freedom
260			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
300			_a77(1), Mar, 2024: p.59-75
520			_aThis paper examines the conditional effects of legislator gender, party, and key district-level characteristics on patterns of roll-call votes. I propose and test a theory of legislative freedom conceptualized as a member of Congress’s ability to defect from their party in roll-call votes. I argue that women members of Congress (MCs) will be more able to exercise legislative freedom in women-friendly districts. I expect both Democratic and Republican women MCs representing women-friendly districts will be more likely than those representing districts that are less women-friendly to defect from party and that the women-friendly district effect will be stronger for Republican women MCs. To test these hypotheses, I use roll-call voting data, women-friendly district data (Palmer and Simon 2006), and original data collected on members of the U.S. House beginning with the 103rd Congress. In this paper, I further explore the proposed theory of legislative freedom to examine recent high-profile cases of women MCs defecting from the Republican party and the conditions in which they exercise this freedom.- Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129231191780
650			_aLegislative freedom, Roll-call voting, Party defection, Women members of Congress, Gender and representation, Women-friendly districts, Republican women legislators, Democratic women legislators, Congressional voting behavior, District-level characteristics, Political party loyalty, Electoral incentives, U.S. House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, Gendered political behavior, Conditional effects, Political risk, Partisan alignment, Legislative autonomy, Empirical analysis _955188
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aLEGISLATIVE FREEDOM
942			_cAR