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100			_aLührmann, Anna and Rooney, Bryan _956284
245			_aAutocratization by decree: States of emergency and democratic decline
260			_aComparative Politics
300			_a 53(4), Jul, 2021: p. 617-636
520			_aStates of emergency grant chief executives the power to bypass democratic constraints in order to combat existential threats. As such, they are ideal tools to erode democratic institutions while maintaining the illusion of constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, states of emergency should be associated with a heightened risk of autocratization – a decline in a regime's democratic attributes. Despite this theoretical link and the contemporary relevance of both autocratization and states of emergency, no prior study has empirically tested this relationship. This article tests this relationship using data on sixty democracies for 1974 to 2016. We find that democracies are 75 percent more likely to erode under a state of emergency. This evidence strongly suggests that states of emergency circumvent democratic processes in ways that might promote democratic decline.- Reproduced https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2021/00000053/00000004/art00004
650			_aEmergency powers, Executive power, Constitutional law, Democracy, Democratization, Authoritarianism, Dictatorship, Political stability, Political institutions, Separation of powers, Civil rights, Rule of law, Comparative government, Political corruption, Constitutional history, Democracy—Case studies, Democracy—Statistical methods _956285
773			_aComparative Politics
906			_aDEMOCRACY
942			_cAR