000			01629nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c527124 _d527124
008			240805b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLaferrière, Vincent et al _956328
245			_aMultigame contact: A double-edged sword for cooperation
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(2). May, 2024: p.39-61
520			_aWe study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210377
650			_aMultigame contact, Cooperation behavior, Prisoner’s dilemma, Experimental design, Repeated interaction, Partner pairing, Game theory, Behavioral outcomes, Linked decisions, Mutual cooperation, Mutual defection, Strategic behavior, Theoretical prediction, Double-edged effect, Decision linkage, Experimental economics, Interaction structure, Cooperation dynamics, Subject behavior, Game-based study _956329
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aGAME THEORY
942			_cAR