000			01720nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c527130 _d527130
008			240805b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCalford, Evan M. and Cason, Timothy N. _956350
245			_aContingent reasoning and dynamic public goods provision
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(2). May, 2024: p.236-266
520			_aContributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220111
650			_aPublic goods, Contribution behavior, Contingent reasoning, Dynamic decisions, Static decisions, Information revelation, Equilibrium analysis, Partially cursed individuals, Contingent events, Nash players, Behavioral experiment, Future inference, Past inference, Concurrent inference, Provision mechanism, Contribution levels, Strategic thinking, Experimental economics, Welfare implications, Collective action _956351
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aPUBLIC GOODS
942			_cAR