000			01631nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c527131 _d527131
008			240805b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aWei, Dong and Green, Brett _956348
245			_aReverse Price discrimination with information design
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(2). May, 2024: p.267-295
520			_aA seller markets a good to a customer whose willingness to pay depends on his private type and the good's quality. The seller designs a screening mechanism that specifies both transfers and information revealed about quality. We show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a menu of price-experiment pairs, featuring both price discrimination and information discrimination: buyers with higher private types face lower prices and receive less discerning positive signals. Moreover, we demonstrate the complementarity between these two forms of discrimination. Information design facilitates surplus creation on the extensive margin, but causes surplus destruction on the intensive margin.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220242
650			_aScreening mechanism, Price discrimination, Information discrimination, Private type, Product quality, Transfer design, Optimal mechanism, Menu design, Buyer incentives, Signal design, Surplus creation, Surplus destruction, Extensive margin, Intensive margin, Information design, Economic modeling, Mechanism design, Consumer behavior, Strategic pricing, Market segmentation _956349
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aMARKET STRUCTURE
942			_cAR