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100			_aOlivera, Rosina Rodríguez _956346
245			_aStrategic incentives and the optimal sale of information
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(2). May, 2024: p.296-353
520			_aA monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anticoordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210372
650			_aData markets, Information design, Monopolist seller, Buyer screening, Optimal menu, Strategic incentives, Private information, Surplus extraction, Information correlation, Willingness to pay, Perfect information, Partial information, Coordination incentives, Anticoordination incentives, Belief congruence, Experimental design, Information asymmetry, Market segmentation, Economic theory, Incentive compatibility _956347
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aINFORMATION ECONOMICS
942			_cAR