000			01312nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c527493 _d527493
008			240902b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMoreira, Diana and Pérez, Santiago _957713
245			_aCivil service exams and organizational performance: Evidence from the Pendleton act
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a16(3), Jul, 2024: p.250-291
520			_aWe use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees' professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts' hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts' top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220284
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aCIVIL SERVICE
942			_cAR