000			01797nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c527715 _d527715
008			240917b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aShameer, K. Muhammed and Durai, S. Raja Sethu _947707
245			_aThe political budget cycle: Evidence from Indian municipal corporation elections
260			_aReview of Development and Change
300			_a29(1), Jun, 2024:p.86-105
520			_aThe political budget cycle (PBC) theory deals with increased spending or decreased revenue collection, or a combination of both, on the verge of an election by the incumbent government to retain office. Empirical verification of the PBC theory at the subnational local government level is scarce in the literature. Subnational local governments are more prominent in population and budget for a country like India. This study takes into account 34 municipal corporations in India to examine the PBC theory and find strong evidence of politically motivated cycles on the budget expenditure and revenue front. Notably, the more visible expenditure on welfare schemes shows increased spending during an election period. On the revenue side, this study also finds evidence in support of the PBC theory. Indian municipal corporations are creating ‘welfare’ and ‘infrastructure’ cycles during the election period to gain political profit and are validating the ‘visibility’ and ‘targetability’ hypotheses described in the literature. This study is the first attempt to trace the presence of the PBC at the subnational local government level in India.- Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09722661241256713
650			_a Budget, Municipal cooperation, Political budget cycles, Public fiancé. _947708
773			_aReview of Development and Change
942			_cAR