000			01345nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c527786 _d527786
008			240924b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBenson, David et al _958455
245			_aConcentration and geographic proximity in antitrust policy: Evidence from bank mergers
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(3), Aug, 2024: p.107-133
520			_aAntitrust often uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for merger screening and review. We argue that HHI-based antitrust policy using predefined markets in the banking industry misses anticompetitive effects that are predicted by the proximity of merging branch networks. Difference-in-differences estimates from thousands of mergers reveal that close-proximity bank acquisitions have harmful effects, including branch closures, even if they fall below the HHI threshold for enforcement. Neither lowering the threshold nor using narrower predefined markets addresses this underenforcement without introducing significant overenforcement and underenforcement of other transactions. However, using a proximity threshold to complement the HHI policy could improve bank antitrust.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220094
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aBANKING AND FINANCE
942			_cAR