000			01265nam a22001337a 4500
999			_c527789 _d527789
008			240925b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBochet, Olivier and Magnani, Jacopo _947793
245			_aLimited strategic thinking and the cursed match
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a16(3), Aug, 2024: p.321-344
520			_aIn vertically differentiated matching markets with private information, agents face an acceptance curse: being accepted as a partner conveys bad news. We experimentally investigate whether individuals anticipate the acceptance curse in such an environment. We test the effect of an exogenous change in reservation values, making some types more selective and inducing significant changes in the posterior distribution of match qualities. Consistent with limited strategic sophistication, subjects don't respond to this manipulation. Through additional investigation and structural estimations, we suggest a mechanism explaining the lack of subjects' response: out-of-equilibrium beliefs are quantitatively more important than limited conditional thinking. – Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210344
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
942			_cAR