000			01140nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c527840 _d527840
008			240927b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAmador, Manuel and Bianchi, Javier _958665
245			_aBank runs, fragility, and credit easing
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a114(7), Jul, 2024: p.2073-2110
520			_aWe present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy-wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences.- Reproduced https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20220328
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aBANKING AND FINANCE
942			_cAR