000			01483pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCoats, Jennifer C.
245			_aApplications of principal agent models to government contracting and accountability decision making
260			_c2002
300			_ap.441-61.
520			_aThis paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alternative to the identification of key decision properties "from the ground up" for each good or service the government provides. - Reproduced.
650			_aAccountability
650			_aDecision making
650			_aPublic administration
773			_aInternational Journal of Public Administration
909			_a52785
999			_c52785 _d52785