000			01528nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c528404 _d528404
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100			_aQian, Jingyuan and Bai, Steve _949275
245			_aLoyalty signaling, bureaucratic compliance, and variation in state repression in authoritarian regimes
260			_aComparative Politics
300			_a56(3), Jul, 2024: p.423-447
520			_aIn autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our theory using China’s Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957‐1959), a repressive campaign launched by Mao Zedong against alleged critics of his rule. We find that officials who were former undercover partisans, a faction considered untrustworthy by Mao, tended to prosecute more “rightists” in their jurisdictions and imposed harsher penalties on them. This study contributes to the literature by revealing the motivations of coercive agents.- Reproduced https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2024/00000056/00000004/art00002
650			_aAnti-rightist campaign, Authoritarian regime, China, Maozedong, Repression. _949276
773			_aComparative Politics
942			_cAR