000			01226nam a22001337a 4500
999			_c528418 _d528418
008			241204b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_ahig, Stephan and Zamboni, Yves _949302
245			_aJudicial presence and rent extraction
260			_aEconomic Development and Cultural Change
300			_a73(1), Oct, 2024: p.87-126
520			_aWe estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments. Rents are measured as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors. We exploit an informal institutional rule that assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties that form a judicial district. By comparing municipalities that are the most populous in their judicial districts with municipalities from other judicial districts in the same state that have identical population size but are not the most populous in their judicial districts, we find that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections that uncover irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10%.- Reproduced https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/726539
773			_aEconomic Development and Cultural Change
942			_cAR