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100			_a Weyland, Kurt _954370
245			_aWhy populist authoritarians rarely turn into repressive dictators
260			_aComparative Politics
300			_a57(2), Jan, 2025: p.193-218
520			_aWhy do most authoritarian regimes installed by populist chief executives not become full-scale, repressive dictatorships? As explanation, scholars argue that populist leaders base their rule on charismatic appeal and voluntary mass support; therefore, they do not need harsh coercion, which would undermine their popular legitimacy. While corroborating this argument, I highlight a crucial complementary factor: populist chief executives find it difficult to marshal large-scale political repression. After all, their insistence on personalistic autonomy and unconstrained predominance creates tension with the military institution, the mainstay of organized coercion. Due to this inherent distance, most populist rulers lack the dependable military support to sustain the imposition of harsh autocracy. I substantiate these arguments with relevant cases from contemporary Latin America, especially Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru. -Reproduced https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/cuny/cp/2025/00000057/00000002/art00004
650			_aAuthoritarianism, Charisma, Dictatorship, Latin America, Military, Populism _954371
773			_0Comparative Politics
942			_cAR