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100			_aThijm, Joris and Fernandes, Jorge M. _955701
245			_aParties and coalition governance in presidential democracies
260			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
300			_a78(2), Jun, 2025: p.481-494
520			_aUnder what conditions do political parties employ junior ministers to keep tabs on their coalition partners in multiparty cabinets in presidential democracies? Existing literature on coalition governance in presidential systems has focused mainly on the role of presidents in monitoring coalition partners. Political parties have yet to be noticed. This paper contributes to the literature by placing parties front and center as strategic actors in presidential coalition governance. Specifically, we look at the conditions in which political parties employ junior ministers to shadow their coalition partners. Using an original data set covering 25 cabinets in seven presidential democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, we find that parties strategically use junior ministers to curb delegation perils and implement their collectively agreed-upon policy preferences. Our findings show that parties shadow nonpartisan ministers more extensively where presidents are strong. Furthermore, we show that democratic experience cements the use of coalition governance tools, suggesting an institutional learning process.- Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10659129241309092
650			_aPresidentialism, Presidential coalitions, Coalition governance, Junior ministers. _955702
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
942			_cAR