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100			_aSteinebach, Yves Hinterieitner, Markus Fernandez-I-Marin, Xavier _957854
245			_aRegulatory offsetting in advanced democracies
260			_aPublic Administration Review
300			_a82(5), Sep-Oct, 2025: p.1398-1411
520			_aThe growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so-called “regulatory offsetting schemes,” requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth.- Reproduced https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13887
773			_aPublic Administration Review
942			_cAR