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999			_c531959 _d531959
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100			_aYackee, Susan Webb _957857
245			_a Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus
260			_aPublic Administration Review
300			_a82(5), Sep-Oct, 2025: p.1445-1459
520			_aElected chief executives in the United States—that is, governors and presidents—routinely attempt to achieve their domestic policy goals by influencing the decision-making of public agencies. I provide empirical assessments of the two most frequently theorized elected executive influence tactics: political appointments and the centralization of agency decision-making. Using an expansive survey of the leaders in over 1800 state agencies, observational and experimental evidence are used to evaluate the effectiveness of these tactics. I find that state agency leaders believe that the appointment of officials to key agency posts allows the governor to better achieve his or her policy objectives than centralizing decision-making, and Republican governors are seen as more successful in using these tactics than Democratic ones. Overall, the results provide a real-world sense of how one government institution—the elected chief executive—tries to steer the policymaking of public managers and the government agencies that they lead.- Reproduced https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13899
773			_aPublic Administration Review
942			_cAR