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_c532902 _d532902 |
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| 008 | 260401b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
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_aGarica, Gustavo A. Posso, Christian and Arango, Salome _959910 |
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| 245 | _a Minimum-wage effects, compliance, and firm size in a developing economy: Evidence from Colombia | ||
| 260 | _aThe Developing Economies | ||
| 300 | _a 63(4), Dec, 2025: p.301-327 | ||
| 520 | _aMinimum-wage legislation is a standard policy in most developing countries. Nonetheless, the consequences of increases in the minimum-wage are not conclusive. This paper examines the heterogeneous effects of minimum-wage, considering the imperfect enforcement of minimum-wage policy and different compliance levels across the firm sizes and types of workers, analyzing the Colombian case. Our identification strategy uses policy circumstances to set the minimum-wage associated with arbitrary decisions not explained by the fundamentals determining the minimum-wage. Using instrumental variable techniques, we show that a 10% increase in the minimum-wage reduces the employment rate by 1.27 percentage points and 0.70 percentage points in the proportion of hours worked. Consistent with a theoretical model of minimum-wage policy with imperfect competition and enforcement, the negative minimum-wage effect is larger in firms with higher levels of compliance—that is, medium- and large-sized firms, and within these, the unskilled workers are the most affected.- Reproduced https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/deve.12443 | ||
| 773 | _aThe Developing Economies | ||
| 942 | _cAR | ||