000			01389pab a2200193 454500
008			180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLehoucq, Fabrice E.
245			_aCan parties police themselves? Electoral governance and democratization
260			_c2002
300			_ap.29-46.
362			_aJan
520			_aThis article outlines the logic and consequences of the classic theory of electoral governance. By empowering the executive with the administration of elections and the legislature with the certification of the vote tally, the theory expected elected officials to generate widely acceptable election results. This article argues that the classical theory breaks down when the same party controls the executive and the legislature. Developments in several presidential systems offer tentative support for its central hypothesis. Only when parties delegated election governance to an autonomous court system did election conflicts stop promoting political instability. Comparisons between US and Latin American separation of power systems also suggest that political developments in North and South America are much more similar than commonly assumed. - Reproduced.
650			_aPolitical parties
650			_aDemocratization
650			_aPublic administration
650			_aElections
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
909			_a54589
999			_c54589 _d54589