000			01576pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSherman, Richard
245			_aDelegation, ratification, and U.S. trade policy: why divided government causes lower tariffs
260			_c2002
300			_ap.1171-197.
362			_aDec
520			_aRecent research on executive-legislative relations concludes that divided government causes higher tariffs and inhibits international cooperation. I find that divided government leads to lower U.S. tariffs in the postwar period and that the theoretical connection between divided government and international cooperation is viable only as a special case. In the contemporary United States, trade policy preferences do not adhere to party lines: Democratic Congresses are more protectionist than Republican Congresses, but Democratic presidents are less protectionist than their Republican counterparts. The divergence of executive-legislative preferences is thus greater under unified government than under divided overnment. As a cross-national hypothesis, the claim that divided government inhibits international cooperation holds only if some special restrictions on partisan preferences are met. These conditions are unlikely to survive as generalizations about democratic polities, rendering implausible the connection between divided government and reduced international cooperation. - Reproduced.
650			_aUnited States - Commerce
650			_aTrade
773			_aComparative Political Studies
909			_a54938
999			_c54938 _d54938