000			01144pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2003 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGhosh, Saibal
245			_aAre basel capital standards pro-cyclical? Some empirical evidence from India
260			_c2003
300			_ap.777-84.
362			_a22 Feb
520			_aThe debate on bank capital regulation has in recent years devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions play as a part of the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. The new Capital Accord is also attempting to address provisioning practices within a broad capital regulatory framework. This paper contributes to the debate by exploring the available evidence about bank loan loss provisioning in the Indian context. Using data on state-owned banks for the period 1997-2002, we find that banks tend to delay provisioning for bad loans until too late, possibly magnifying the impact of the economic cycles on their income and capital. - Reproduced.
650			_aBanks - India
650			_aBanks
700			_aNachane, D.M.
773			_aEconomic and Political Weekly
909			_a55771
999			_c55771 _d55771