000			01210pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2003 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aManzetti, Luigi
245			_aPolitical manipulations and market reforms failures
260			_c2003
300			_ap.315-60.
362			_aApr
520			_aEconomists have recently underscored that the failure of market reforms in producing sustained growth in emerging markets is the result of poor advice from the International Monetary Fund, as well as of erroneous macroeconomic policies of domestic decision makers. This article proposes a complementary hypothesis. If market reforms are enacted in a political system with weak accountability institutions, then one should expect the executive to manipulate such reforms in pursuit of such old-fashioned practices as collusion between government and business, political patronage, and corruption. This, in turn, ends up depriving a given economy of potential advantages that could have accrued had the reforms promoted true competition rather than reallocating monopolistic rents and squandering a large amount of resources. Reproduced.
650			_aMarket economy
773			_aWorld Politics
909			_a58015
999			_c58015 _d58015