000			01452pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2003 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMukherjee, Bumba
245			_aPolitical parties and the size of government in multiparty legislatures: examining cross-country and panel data evidence
260			_c2003
300			_ap.699-728.
362			_aAug
520			_aThis article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government - proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP - in multiparty legislatures. The author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure. Conversely, as the size of the majority party grows from a bare-minimum majority to above the supermajority level, it has a nonlinear, specifically "cube" effect on central government expenditure. Panel data on central government expenditure from 110 countries are used to test these arguments. The results corroborate the theoretical claims and are robust in regression models where fixed-effects were introduced and endogeneity was corrected. Finally, an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher government spending on subsidies and transfers but to lower spending on public goods. - Reproduced.
650			_aPolitical parties
773			_aComparative Political Studies
909			_a58077
999			_c58077 _d58077