| 000 | 00853pab a2200181 454500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 008 | 180718b2003 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | _aAskildsen, Jan-Erik | ||
| 245 | _aBargaining credibility and the limits to within-firm pensions | ||
| 260 | _c2003 | ||
| 300 | _ap.515-28. | ||
| 362 | _aDec | ||
| 520 | _aA simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low-risk investment policy for firms which offer within-house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined. - Reproduced. | ||
| 650 | _aSocial security | ||
| 650 | _aPensions | ||
| 700 | _aIreland, Norman J. | ||
| 773 | _aAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics | ||
| 909 | _a59223 | ||
| 999 |
_c59223 _d59223 |
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