000			01460pab a2200193 454500
008			180718b2004 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSmith, Kevin B.
245			_aA mixed relationship: bureaucracy and school performance
260			_c2004
300			_ap.728-36.
362			_aNov-Dec
520			_aWe argue the negative relationship between school bureaucracy and school performance that is commonly reported in the bureaucracy and educational policy literature is theoretically and empirically incomplete. Like most public agencies operating in complex task environments, we suggest that schools have to make trade-offs between the multiple outputs they are expected to produce. Bureaucracy plays an important role in determining the nature of these trade-offs: one that is more multidimensional than it is portrayed in the existing literature. We find bureaucracy's relationship with school performance depends on how performance is measured. It is negatively associated with test scores but positively associated with other performance measures such as attendance and dropout rates. This is consistent with an economies-of-scope perspective of bureaucracy, which emphasizes bureaucracy's role in managing the trade-offs inherent in pursuing multiple goals. - Reproduced.
650			_aEducation
650			_aSchools
650			_aBureaucracy
700			_aLarimer, Christopher W.
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a63367
999			_c63367 _d63367