000			01770pab a2200205 454500
008			180718b2004 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aYesilkagit, Kutsal
245			_aReform styles of political and administrative elites in majoritarian and consensus democracies: public management reform
260			_c2004
300			_ap.951-74.
520			_aOne of the most important claims advanced by comparative public management studies is that these reforms have been more successfully implemented in majoritarian than in consensus democracies. The claim is built on the premise that the institutional structure of a majoritarian democracy enables a parliamentary majority to implement policies unilaterally and in a desired way whereas the institutional structure of a consensus democracy forces parliamentary majorities to negotiate compromises. This claim, we argue, lacks sufficient empirical backing, is biased by studies focusing on the initiation of reforms, and needs serious rethinking in the light of recent empirical studies that downplay the salience of institutions as an explanatory factor for variations in policy reform. With The Netherlands and New Zealand as cases, this article first shows that far-reaching reforms can be implemented in consensus systems too; secondly, it develops a model that centres on the interplay between institutions and politicians' reform styles and applies this to these countries. - Reproduced.
650			_aPublic administration - Netherlands
650			_aPublic administration - New Zealand
650			_aAdministrative reform - Netherlands
650			_aAdministrative reform - New Zealand
650			_aAdministrative reform
700			_aVries, Jouke De
773			_aPublic Administration
909			_a64155
999			_c64155 _d64155