000			01149pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2005 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aTollepsen, Deborah
245			_aLet's Pretend' children and joint action
260			_c2005
300			_ap.75-97.
362			_aMar
520			_aAccording to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman's analysis of joint intention that reflects the socio-cognitive abilities young children do have. This revision makes sense of joint action among young children and equally well explains simple joint actions involving adults. - Reproduced.
650			_aChildren
650			_aYouth
773			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
909			_a64332
999			_c64332 _d64332