000			01321pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2005 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSaiegh, Sebastian M.
245			_aDo countries have a "democratic advantage"? Political institutions multilateral agencies, and sovereign borrowing
260			_c2005
300			_ap.366-87.
362			_aMay
520			_aThis article examines the effect of political institutions on countries' risk characteristics and the role that domestic political institutions pay in determining the interest rates charged to less developed countries. According to the "democratic advantage" argument, democracies should pay lower interest rates than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. The author argues that such a claim must be revised in the case of developing countries. The results presented in this article support this assertion. First, they show that democracies are more likely to reschedule their debts, so they have no advantage; rather, the opposite is true. Second, there does not appear to be a significant difference between the interest rates paid by democracies and nondemocracies. - Reproduced.
650			_aInterest rates
650			_aPolitical institutions
773			_aComparative Political Studies
909			_a65166
999			_c65166 _d65166