000			01091pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2005 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJeanne, Olivier
245			_aThe Mussa theorem (and other results on IMF-induced moral hazard)
260			_c2005
300			_ap.64-84.
520			_aUsing a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at a actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999 and 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem. - Reproduced.
650			_aInternational Monetary Fund
700			_aZettelmeyer, Jeromin
773			_aIMF Staff Papers
909			_a68924
999			_c68924 _d68924