000			01135pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2006 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJacobi, Tonja
245			_aThe senatorial courtesy game: explaining the norm of information vetoes in advice and consent nominations
260			_c2006
300			_ap.193-217.
362			_aMay
520			_aDespite the contentiousness of advice and consent nominations, the Senate usually rejects a candidate to whom a home senator objects. Using game theory, this article explains the persistence of senatorial courtesy and maps its effects on which candidates succeed. The greater salience of a home nomination allows retaliation and reciprocity in a repeated game to elicit support for a veto, even under adverse conditions. Comparative statics indicate the range of the president's feasible nominees and show which players gain and lose from the practice. Most notably, the president can benefit from an exercise of senatorial courtesy. - Reproduced.
650			_aUnited States. Congress - Senate
650			_aParliament
773			_aLegislative Studies Quarterly
909			_a69075
999			_c69075 _d69075